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Abstract
We study interfirm competition on a product market where effort decisions are dele-
gated to the firms’ workers. Intrafirm organization is captured by a principal-multi-
agent framework where firm owners implement alternative compensation schemes
for the workers. We show that the value of delegation as well as the optimal de-
sign of the compensation scheme crucially depend on the intensity of competition.
In particular, our model explains why piece rates and performance-based revenue
sharing may be observed in different markets at the same time.
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Traditional principal-agent models deal exclusively with intrafirm organization and
analyze compensation contracts between a principal (the firm owner) and one or
more agents (the workers). In these models, delegation to agents results from agents’
superior information or abilities (see, e.g., Laffont and Martimort 2002 or Macho-
Stadler and Perez-Castrillo 1997). In this paper, we emphasize a further reason why
it might be in the interest of a principal to delegate decisions to agents: strategic
competition.
In the industrial organization literature, strategic competition is widely analyzed,
but the models either concentrate on interfirm competition between monolithic firms
(see, e.g., Tirole 1988) or they combine intrafirm and interfirm interaction where
principals of competing firms employ manager agents (see, e.g., Vickers 1985, Fersht-
man 1985, Fershtman and Judd 1987, 2006 Sklivas 1987, Hermalin 1992, Cailland,
Jullien and Picard 1995, Schmidt 1997, Jansen, van Lier and van Witteloostuijn
2007). These manager agents decide on quantities (or prices), but they are not in-
volved in the production process itself and face no effort cost of producing.1 Strategic
competition by delegating decisions to worker agents is largely ignored in this lit-
erature, i.e. the direct link to the principal-agent models in business economics is
missing.
This paper aims to fill this gap. We analyze competing firms each employing worker
agents who decide on their effort levels anticipating how their decisions affect their ef-
fort costs. The basic principal-agent framework with risk-neutral individuals is there-
fore extended to account for competition between owner principals on oligopolistic
product markets. While single-firm principal-agent models ignore these competition
effects, our analysis extends previous work by Güth, Pull and Stadler (2011, 2012)
to shed light on how worker compensation is affected by interfirm competition.
In the present paper, we analyze different worker-compensation systems that vary
along several dimensions (see, e.g., Gerhart, Minkoff, and Olsen 1995 for an overview).
Specifically, we compare (i) a piece-rate compensation system, (ii) a revenue-sharing
1In some of the models, firm owners hire managers whose task it is to reduce unit production
cost. Hence, managers suffer from effort costs, but these are independent of the level of production
(see, e.g., Graziano and Parigi 1998, Raith 2003, Beiner, Schmid and Wanzenried 2011).
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system where the workers’ share is equally distributed among the workers (1/n rev-
enue sharing) and (iii) a revenue-sharing scheme where an individual worker’s share
of the revenue depends on his individual performance (performance-based revenue
sharing). Accordingly, we cover a spectrum of mechanisms each following a dis-
tinct logic: While piece rates are based on individual absolute performance, 1/n
revenue sharing is a classical team incentive where only team performance counts.
Performance-based revenue sharing combines (absolute) team incentives with indi-
vidual (relative) performance incentives.2
Our approach is appropriate to explain the dominance of the one or the other incen-
tive mechanism depending on (i) the intensity of competition on the product market
and (ii) the number of workers employed by each firm. In particular, our analysis
predicts that revenue-sharing programs and piece-rate compensation schemes should
be wide spread in rather homogeneous markets, characterized by intense (quantity)
competition. This is due to a strategic effect of delegating production decisions to
workers. In heterogeneous markets with less intense competition this strategic dele-
gation effect is weak, so that firm owners prefer not to delegate - if possible.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we analyze a bench-
mark model with two competing monolithic firms without delegation. In Section 3
we introduce delegation accompanied by piece-rate compensation. Intrafirm inter-
action is taken into account by analyzing two different revenue-sharing schemes: In
Section 4, the workers’ revenue share is equally distributed among the workers, in-
dependently of an individual worker’s contribution. In Section 5, a worker’s revenue
share is based on his relative performance. Section 6 compares the outcomes of the
different compensation schemes in a more general setting, Section 7 concludes.
2While piece-rate compensation schemes are on the decline in manufacturing (see, e.g., Helper,
Kleiner and Wang 2010), empirically they still play a role in the form of, e.g., sales commissions.
Furthermore, they present an interesting reference case for the analysis of the revenue-sharing
compensation schemes.
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2 A Benchmark Model with Competing Mono-
lithic Firms
We consider a heterogeneous product market with two firms i= 1,2, each producing a
substitute good. According to Singh and Vives (1984), the inverse demand functions
are specified by
pi = 1−qi − γq j ; i, j = 1,2, i 6= j ,
where the (inverse) heterogeneity parameter γ ∈ [0,1] indicates the intensity of com-
petition. In the limit case of γ = 0, the market is completely separated into two
independent monopoly markets without strategic interaction between firms. In the
other limit case of γ = 1, the market is homogeneous implying intense competition
between the firms. The single production input is the effort ei,k of workers k = 1, ...,n
in each firm i = 1,2, where the effort-cost function is quadratic, c(ei,k) = e
2
i,k/2. The
output of firm i amounts to qi = ∑
n
k=1 ei,k. In order to keep the model analytically
tractable, we assume that the total supply of 2n workers is equally distributed across
the two firms in the considered market.3
We start with analyzing a benchmark scenario where competing monolithic firms do
not delegate output decisions. In this no-delegation (ND) game, firms decide on the
effort of each worker and hence on the whole firm output such that firm surpluses
are determined by
Si = (1−qi − γq j)qi −q2i /(2n) .






3It can be shown that both firms have an incentive to hire as many workers as possible, given
the rival’s number of employed workers. Since heterogeneity provides an incentive for workers to
equally distribute across firms, this symmetry assumption is justified. The number n of workers
employed by each firm can therefore be interpreted as representing half of the market-specific labor
force. If the focus were on the endogenous determination of an intermediate number of workers,
one could account for a decreasing marginal product of worker effort (see, e.g., Das 1996). However,

















Efforts, prices and firm surpluses are decreasing in the intensity of competition γ.
The numerical solutions for n = 2 workers per firm and the two extreme cases with
minimal (γ = 0) and maximal (γ = 1) intensities of competition are presented in
Table 1.
Table 1: Results for the ND game with n = 2 worker agents per firm
eND qND pND SND
γ = 0 0.200 0.400 0.600 0.200
γ = 1 0.143 0.286 0.429 0.102
3 Delegation via Piece-Rate Compensation
To analyze the effects of delegation, we proceed by assuming that the two firms, each
consisting of one owner (principal) and n workers (agents), play a two-stage dele-
gation game. In the first stage, the owners i = 1,2 simultaneously write observable
piece-rate contracts with their workers, specifying the wage rates wi per effort unit.
We abstain from fixed worker payments which could be endogenized by introducing
binding participation constraints.4 In this piece-rate (PR) compensation game firm
owners earn profits
πi = (1−qi − γq j −wi)qi , i, j = 1,2, i 6= j .
4Depending on reservation utilities, endogenized fixed payments might become negative. Ab-
staining from including endogenized fixed payments can be justified (i) by legally prescribed non-
negative minimum wages and (ii) by limited liability of workers - excluding negative payments even
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Workers are awarded according to their contracts and suffer from effort cost of
producing, i.e. they realize net utilities
U(wi,ei,k) = wiei,k − e2i,k/2 .
In the second stage of the game, workers maximize their net utilities with respect
to efforts ei,k, such that
ei,k = wi
for all k = 1, ...,n and i = 1,2. Since workers’ effort depends on the firm-specific piece
rates wi only, there is neither intra- nor interfirm interaction between agents.
By anticipating these effort decisions of workers, in the first stage principals maxi-
mize profits
πi = (1− (n+1)wi − γnw j)nwi
with respect to the piece rates wi. The equilibrium solution is characterized by the
efforts


















in case of (out-of-equilibrium) negligible effort levels, and (iii) empirically with fixed payments from
workers being rarely observed in practice. In a situation with endogenized fixed payments, how-
ever, worker efforts and firm surpluses would in fact coincide with the benchmark solution of the
no-delegation game. We are indebted to a referee for this remark.
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such that the firm surpluses add up to




It becomes obvious that efforts, prices, firm profits and surpluses are decreasing in
the intensity of competition γ. The numerical solutions for n = 2 workers per firm
and the two extreme cases of minimal (γ = 0) and maximal (γ = 1) intensities of
competition are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Results for the PR game with n = 2 worker agents per firm
ePR qPR pPR πPR UPR SPR
γ = 0 0.167 0.333 0.666 0.167 0.014 0.194
γ = 1 0.125 0.250 0.500 0.094 0.008 0.109
Compared to the benchmark solution without delegation (see Table 1), piece-rate
compensation leads to a lower surplus in the case without competition (γ = 0), but
to a higher surplus in case of intense competition (γ = 1). Thus, from the perspective
of an isolated firm, delegation to workers has a negative value, i.e. absent any other
justification for delegation (e.g. asymmetries in abilities or information), owners
prefer not to delegate. With intense interfirm competition, however, delegation has
a positive value since piece rates can be used as a strategic instrument to reduce
workers’ effort and – as a consequence – to raise prices and surpluses.5 Due to this
delegation effect, our model predicts piece rates to be more pronounced and wide
spread in rather homogeneous and highly competitive markets as compared to rather
heterogeneous or even monopolistic market structures.
While, empirically, the relation between the intensity of competition and incentive
compensation for managers has been found to be positive (see, e.g., Cunat and
5This effect corresponds to strategic underinvestment in capacities in order to soften price
competition and to increase profits (see, e.g., Kreps and Scheinkman 1983 for homogeneous and
Maggi 1996 for heterogeneous markets).
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Guadalupe 2009 or Beiner, Schmid and Wanzenried 2011), we are not aware of
any comparable study for worker compensation. However, as Berger, Herbertz and
Sliwka (2011) have shown, the prevalence of incentive compensation systems for
workers varies substantially between different markets with a large share of firms
using performance-related pay for their workers in, e.g., financial services, and a
considerably lower share in, e.g., the food markets. Different degrees of competition
intensity might in fact be part of the story.
4 Delegation via a 1/n Revenue-Sharing Compen-
sation Scheme
As an alternative to piece-rate compensation, we now analyze the delegation effect
of a compensation scheme where each owner principal decides on the revenue share
si ∈ [0,1] offered to his worker agents as a whole and where the share is ex ante equally
distributed among the n workers of the firm. Again, we abstain from an additional
fixed payment. In this revenue-sharing (RSE) game, owners simultaneously write
observable revenue-sharing contracts with their workers, specifying the individual
revenue shares (si/n) and earn profits
πi = (1− si)(1−qi− γq j)qi, i, j = 1,2, i 6= j .
Each of the agents, k = 1, ...,n, employed by firm i = 1,2, realizes net utility
Ui,k(ei,k) = (si/n)(1−qi − γq j)qi − e2i,k/2 .
Maximization with respect to the efforts ei,k in the second stage yields the agents’
first-order conditions
(si/n)(1−2qi − γq j)− ei,k = 0 ,
whose symmetric solution is
e∗i (si,s j) =
si(1+(2− γ)s j)/n
1+2(si + s j)+(4− γ2)sis j
.
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Anticipating these equilibrium efforts, principals realize profits
πi(si,s j) = (1− si)(1−ne∗i − γne∗j)ne∗i .
In the first stage, principals maximize profits with respect to si. The symmetric
equilibrium is implicitly determined by the fourth-order polynomial equation
(4− γ2)s4 +8s3 +(7− γ2)s2−1 = 0 , (3)
which has a single solution sRSE in the range [0,1]. This optimal revenue share offered
by the principals is increasing in the intensity of competition γ, but does not depend
on the number of agents employed. Given the subgame perfect revenue shares sRSE ,





leading to the output levels qRSE = neRSE , prices pRSE = 1−(1+γ)neRSE , firm profits
(1− sRSE)(1− (1+ γ)neRSE)neRSE , worker net utilities sRSE(1− (1+ γ)neRSE)eRSE −
(eRSE)2/2 and surpluses
SRSE = (1− (1+ γ)neRSE)neRSE −n(eRSE)2/2 . (4)
The explicit solution for the special case of γ = 1 is derived in the Appendix. The
numerical solutions for n = 2 workers per firm and the two extreme cases of minimal
(γ = 0) and maximal (γ = 1) intensities of competition are presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Results for the RSE game with n = 2 worker agents per firm
sRSE eRSE qRSE pRSE πRSE URSE SRSE
γ = 0 0.317 0.097 0.194 0.806 0.107 0.020 0.147
γ = 1 0.333 0.083 0.167 0.667 0.074 0.015 0.104
Compared to the cases of no delegation (ND) and piece-rate compensation (PR), the
firm surplus in the RSE game is strictly dominated. So we do not expect 1/n revenue-
sharing schemes to be used in practice. In fact, existing revenue-sharing systems
typically do not foresee that each individual worker receives the same amount of
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the revenue share ex ante. Rather, individual worker shares vary between different
groups of employees and different hierarchical levels (arguably mirroring different
degrees to which the respective workers contribute to firm performance). As will be
shown in the next section, our ranking results change in a situation where revenues
are not ex ante equally shared among workers, but are based on relative performance.
5 Delegation via a Performance-Based Revenue-
Sharing Compensation Scheme
As an alternative, we now follow Güth, Pull and Stadler (2011) and assume that
the principals decide on revenue shares si ∈ [0,1] which are distributed across the
worker agents according to an incentive device, based on the relative output per-
formance ei,k/qi of workers. We generalize our previous model by allowing for inter-
mediate intensities of competition γ in order to compare the performance with that
of the benchmark case without delegation and that of the alternative compensation
schemes discussed above. In this performance-based revenue-sharing (RSP) game,
owners earn profits
πi = (1− si)(1−qi− γq j)qi , i, j = 1,2, i 6= j .
In the second stage of the game, workers simultaneously choose their effort levels
ei,k to maximize net utilities
Ui,k(ei,k) = si(ei,k/qi)piqi − e2i,k/2 = siei,k(1−qi − γq j)− e2i,k/2 .
The equilibrium effort levels
e∗i (si,s j) =
si(1+(1+(1− γ)n)s j)
1+(n+1)(si+ s j)+((1− γ2)n2+2n+1)sis j
depend on the strategic variables (si,s j) chosen by both of the principals. Thus there
is intra- and interfirm interaction between agents. Anticipating these equilibrium
efforts, principals realize profits
πi(si,s j) = (1− si)(1−ne∗i − γne∗j)ne∗i .
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Maximizing these profits with respect to the revenue shares in the first stage leads
to a symmetric equilibrium implicitly determined by the fourth-order polynomial
equation
[(1− γ2)n2 +2n+1]s4+[4(n+1)]s3+[(1− γ2)n2+2n+4]s2 −1 = 0 , (5)
which has a single root sRSP in the range [0,1].





leading to the output levels qRS = neRSP, prices pRSP = 1− (1+ γ)neRSP, firm profits
(1− sRSP)(1− (1+ γ)neRSP)neRSP, worker net utilities sRSP(1− (1+ γ)neRSP)eRSP −
(eRSP)2/2 and surpluses
SRSP = (1− (1+ γ)neRSP)neRSP −n(eRSP)2/2 . (6)
The explicit solution for the special case of γ = 1 is derived in the Appendix. The
numerical solutions for n = 2 workers per firm and the two extreme cases with
minimal (γ = 0) and maximal (γ = 1) intensities of competition are presented in
Table 4.
Table 4: Results for the RSP game with n = 2 worker agents per firm
sRSP eRSP qRSP pRSP πRSP URSP SRSP
γ = 0 0.253 0.144 0.288 0.712 0.153 0.015 0.183
γ = 1 0.290 0.118 0.237 0.527 0.089 0.011 0.111
It can be shown that the revenue shares sRSP offered by the principals are increasing
in the intensity of competition γ, while efforts, profits and surpluses are decreasing.
Compared to the benchmark solution without delegation (see Table 1), performance-
based revenue sharing leads to a lower surplus in the case without competition
(γ = 0), but to a higher surplus in case of intense competition (γ = 1). Thus, similar
to the alternative of piece-rate compensation, delegation has a negative value for
an isolated firm. With intense interfirm competition, however, delegation induces
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a positive value and can be used as an alternative strategic instrument to reduce
workers’ efforts and – as a consequence – to raise prices and surpluses.
Compared to the piece-rate compensation model with n = 2 workers, surpluses are
lower in case of soft competition but higher in case of intense competition. Thus, even
in the special case of n= 2, there is no unambiguous ranking of the two compensation
schemes. This calls for a comparison of the compensation schemes in a more general
setting, allowing for varying numbers of workers employed by each firm.
6 Comparison of the Compensation Schemes
In the last step of our analysis, we compare the firms’ surpluses in case of (i) no del-
egation, SND, (ii) piece-rate compensation, SPR, (iii) 1/n revenue-sharing, SRSE , and
(iv) performance-based revenue sharing, SRSP, given alternative numbers of workers
employed by each firm. The equilibrium surpluses for γ = 0, as calculated from (1),
(2), (4) and (6), are presented in Table 5a.
Table 5a: Firm surpluses in case of no competition (γ = 0)
n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 n = 5 n = 6 ... n → ∞
SND 0.167 0.200 0.214 0.222 0.227 0.231 ... 0.250
SPR 0.156 0.194 0.211 0.220 0.226 0.230 ... 0.250
SRSE 0.138 0.147 0.150 0.152 0.153 0.153 ... 0.156
SRSP 0.138 0.183 0.205 0.217 0.223 0.228 ... 0.250
In case of an isolated firm we obtain the clear ranking: SND > SPR > SRSP ≥ SRSE ,
independently of the (finite) number of employed workers. As discussed above, del-
egation has a negative value meaning that, absent any other justification such as
asymmetries in abilities or information, firm owners prefer not to delegate.
On markets characterized by intense competition, however, it depends not only on
the intensity of competition but also on the number of agents employed by the prin-
cipals, which compensation scheme dominates. As shown in Table 5b and illustrated
in Figure 1 for the case of γ = 1, piece-rate compensation dominates for n = 1 and
n ≥ 3, whereas performance-based revenue sharing dominates for n = 2. Thus the
numerical standard case of n = 2 workers turns out to be an exception that is due to
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the inverted-U shaped relationship between n and SRSP: While SND and SRSE mono-
tonically increase in the number of workers, SRSP first increases, reaches a maximum
at n = 3 and decreases afterwards.
Table 5b: Firm surpluses in case of intense competition (γ = 1)
n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 n = 5 n = 6 ... n → ∞
SND 0.094 0.102 0.105 0.107 0.107 0.108 ... 0.111
SPR 0.100 0.109 0.111 0.112 0.112 0.113 ... 0.111
SRSE 0.097 0.104 0.106 0.108 0.108 0.109 ... 0.111
SRSP 0.097 0.111 0.111 0.108 0.104 0.100 ... 0.000
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The reason for the decline of the surplus SRSP for n≥ 2 is that not only the principals,
but also their agents are involved in interfirm competition. This competition pressure
on both hierarchy levels drives the prices down to zero when the number of agents
approaches infinity. The surplus SPR also depends in an inverted-U shaped relation
on the number of workers (with a maximum at n = 6), but is strictly greater than
SRSP for n ≥ 3.
7 Summary and Conclusion
Delegation to sales managers is heavily studied in the industrial organization liter-
ature. But managers do not suffer from the effort of producing what they sell. In
our approach, we explicitly study agents who produce and suffer effort cost from
that production at the same time. Principals implement compensation schemes to
which worker agents react by choosing efforts. Furthermore, our performance-based
revenue-sharing model accounts for the fact that both, principals and agents, com-
pete with each other.
We find that whether delegation to worker agents via piece rates or via performance-
based revenue shares leads to a higher or lower firm surplus compared to the bench-
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mark case of monolithic firms depends on (i) the intensity of competition and (ii) the
firm size, measured by the numbers of employed workers. In particular, our approach
is able to explain why both piece rates and performance-based revenue sharing can
be observed in different heterogeneous markets at the same time.
Appendix
In case of intense competition (γ = 1), both of the revenue-sharing models can be
solved explicitly. In the 1/n revenue-sharing model, by factoring out (1+s)2, equation
(3) simplifies to the quadratic function
3s2 +2s−1 = 0 ,
which has the single positive root
sRSE = 1/3 ,




for all 2n agents employed by the two competing firms. Prices are
pRSE = 2/3 ,
principals’ profits











The numerical solution values for all variables are summarized in Table 3 for n = 2,
the results for the surplus SRSE are summarized in Table 5b for alternative numbers
of agents.
In the performance-based revenue-sharing model, by setting γ = 1 and factoring out
(1+ s)2, equation (5) simplifies to the quadratic function
(2n+1)s2+2s−1 = 0 ,























































The numerical solution values for all variables are summarized in Table 4 for n = 2,
the results for the surplus SRSP are summarized in Table 5b for alternative numbers
of agents.
Of course, in case of only n = 1 agent per firm, the solutions of the two versions of
the revenue-sharing model coincide.
17
References
Beiner, S., Schmid, M., Wanzenried, G. (2011), Product Market Competition, Man-
agerial Incentives and Firm Valuation. European Financial Management 17, 331-366.
Berger, J., Herbertz, C., Sliwka, D. (2011), Incentives and Cooperation in Firms:
Field Evidence. IZA Discussion Paper No. 5618, April 2011.
Caillaud, B., Jullien, B., Picard, P. (1995), Competing Vertical Structures: Precom-
mitment and Renegotiation. Econometrica 63, 621-646.
Cunat, V., Guadalupe, M. (2009), Executive Compensation and Competition in the
Banking and Financial Sectors. Journal of Banking and Finance 33, 495-504.
Das, S.P. (1996), Incentive Pay, Worker Effort, and Trade Protection. Review of
Internatinal Economics 4, 141-151.
Fershtman, C. (1985), Managerial Incentives as a Strategic Variable in Duopolistic
Environment. International Journal of Industrial Organization 3, 245-253.
Fershtman, C., Judd, K.L. (1987), Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly. American
Economic Review 77, 927-940.
Fershtman, C., Judd, K.L. (2006), Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly: Corrigen-
dum. American Economic Review 96, 1367.
Gerhart, B.A., Minkoff, H.B., Olsen, R.N. (1995), Employee Compensation: Theory,
Practice, and Evidence. CAHRS Working Paper No. 5-1-1995.
Graziano, C., Parigi, B.M. (1998), Do Managers Work Harder in Competitive In-
dustries? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 34, 489-498.
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